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INTRODUCTION
T
he task of this paper is to investigate
the sensitivity of Canadian govern-
ment ﬁscal balances to alternative
long-run productivity growth rates. By
implication, the larger the incipient ﬁscal
balances, the greater the scope for the ﬁnanc-
ing of social programs. Whether larger incip-
ient ﬁscal balances would indeed be used for
the ﬁnancing of social programs, or would
instead be used for tax reduction or for pay-
ing down government debt, is beyond the
scope of this paper. But, clearly, determining
the sensitivity of ﬁscal balances to alternative
productivity growth rates is at least an ini-
tial step in determining whether alternative
productivity growth rates would affect the
provision of social programs.
Brieﬂy, we examine the sensitivity of
ﬁscal balances using elements of the FOCUS
macroeconometric model of the Canadian
economy, maintained at the Institute for
Policy Analysis of the University of Toronto,
and a “base case” projection of the Canadian
economy, and of its ﬁscal detail, through the
year 2030. The simulation strategy, the base
case, and the many important assumptions
and judgements that had to be made in doing
the calculations are described in the follow-
ing section.
The results of the calculations, both for
the main alternatives and for selected varia-
tions, are presented in the subsequent sec-
tion. Brieﬂy, we ﬁnd that even minor changes
in long-run productivity growth rates can
cumulate over nearly 30 years to form huge
differences in the absolute ﬁscal resources
available to governments, but smaller differ-
ences result when these ﬁscal resources are





The ﬁrst part of this section examines
the simulation strategy used to measure the
sensitivity of ﬁscal indicators to alternative
productivity growth rates. The second part
reviews the base case on which the calcula-
tions are made, while the third catalogues
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that were required in order to produce the
calculations.
The simulation strategy employed here
parallels, in part, the technique used by the
finance department in recent budgets and ﬁs-
cal statements in estimating the implicit size
of the ﬁscal dividend — see, for example, the
November 2001 Budget (Finance Canada 2001)
and the November 2000 Fiscal Statement
(Finance Canada 2000). For these exercises, the
ﬁnance department had either three or four
macroeconometric modelling groups (of which
the Policy and Economic Analysis Program
was one) tie their models to a common con-
sensus view of the performance of the econo-
my over a ﬁve-year horizon. It then asked the
groups to calculate, using their models, feder-
al revenues and endogenous expenditures (that
is, those driven by economic indicators, such
as employment insurance payouts). In effect,
only parts of each macro model were used —
namely, the ﬁscal modules. These were not
full-model simulations, as much economic
behaviour — for example, the evolution of
inﬂation, real growth, interest rates and the
exchange rate — was tied to a common set of
numbers.
For the current exercise, we begin with
a base-case projection of the Canadian econo-
my through the year 2030 developed by the
Policy and Economic Analysis Program at the
Institute for Policy Analysis. A projection this
far into the future will naturally draw consid-
erable attention, and probably criticism, as dis-
cussed in the section immediately below.
However, the base case and what it says about
the long-term ﬁscal future of Canada are not
the emphasis of this paper. Instead, we are con-
cerned with the sensitivity of this projection to
alternative productivity growth paths.
Alternative productivity growth paths
can occur for wide variety of reasons and can
have many different implications.
1 As we
explore several of the variations, it seems
sensible — indeed necessary — to simplify
the exercise and to make some strong
assumptions about what alternative pro-
ductivity growth paths would look like. For
example, what is one to assume about the
shares of aggregate demand under a lower
(or higher) productivity growth path? A
higher productivity path might or might
not involve higher investment expenditure.
In this case, and in many others, we have
made a simplifying assumption — that the
base-case values will persist. A list of these
assumptions and judgements is provided
below. The important point here is that
much of the macro model has been turned
off in developing the alternative productiv-
ity growth path — just as in the ﬁnance
department ﬁscal dividend exercises. We
use only the revenue and expenditure blocks
of the FOCUS model.
The Base Case to 2030
The calculations begin with a projec-
tion for the Canadian economy through the
year 2030. We make no pretence about this
projection being the deﬁnitive analysis of the
long-term future of the Canadian economy.
There are many outstanding issues requiring
further research — notably, the most likely
productivity growth rate and the impact of
the aging of the baby boom generation on
government revenues and expenditures; much
work remains to be done in examining all of
these issues (on the issue of demographics and
its effect on ﬁscal balances, see, e.g., King and
Jackson 2000). The projection presented and
brieﬂy examined here is intended as no more
96
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sis of ﬁscal sensitivities.
Basic indicators for the projection are
presented in Table 1. Included are actual data
for the year 2000 (the latest available at the
time the projection was prepared) and snap-
shots at ﬁve-year intervals into the future.
As can be seen from the table, the pop-
ulation increases through 2030 but at an
ever-decreasing rate.
2 The story is somewhat
different for employment. We project that
the unemployment rate will settle in the sec-
ond half of the current decade at slightly
higher than 6 percent. While this ﬁgure may
seem a triﬂe low to some and high to others,
this matters relatively little for the underly-
ing base case; the main point is that the unem-
ployment rate will stabilize, which means that
it is labour force growth which determines the
number of employed persons. In contrast to
total population growth, which will contin-
ue to be positive (if only barely) through
2030, employment growth is projected to
touch zero, and even to become negative, by
about the year 2020. The reason for this pro-
jection is, of course, the aging of the baby
boom generation and the passing of this large
cohort into their retirement years.
The base case features a relatively opti-
mistic assumption about productivity growth
over the next three decades. Productivity
growth, by the way, is measured in the model
in the simplest way possible — as the ratio of
real GDP to the number of persons employed.
3
As can be seen, we project that productivity
growth, in terms of output per worker, will
grow an average of about 1.8 percent per year
for the next 30 years. This contrasts with the
1.5-percent rate of growth achieved in the
1990s, and with lower ﬁgures still for the
97
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TABLE 1
Base Case: Selected Economic Indicators, 2000-2030
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Real GDP (billions $2000) 1056 1227 1413 1580 1740 1903 2071
Population (millions) 30.7 32.1 33.3 34.4 35.5 36.5 37.2
Real GDP Per Capita (thousands $2000) 34.3 38.2 42.4 45.9 49.0 52.2 55.7
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 4.4 3.6 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.7
Population Growth Rate (%) 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.8 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
Employed (millions) 14.9 16.1 16.9 17.3 17.4 17.4 17.3
Employment Growth Rate (%) 2.6 1.6 0.7 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Real GDP/Employed (thousands $2000)   70.8 76.3 83.5 91.5 100.2 109.7 119.6
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7
CPI Inﬂation Rate (%) 2.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Gov't of Canada 10-year Bond Rate (%) 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Compound Growth Rates (%) 2000- 2010- 2020-  2000-
2010 2020 2030 2030
Real GDP 3.0 2.1 1.8 2.3
Population 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6
Employment 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.5
Productivity 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
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this recent historical performance, however, we
anticipate that information technology and its
gradual dissemination throughout the econo-
my, together with a more educated workforce
and the projected relatively high level of invest-
ment, will serve to push the average productiv-
ity growth rate higher than it has been in the
last 20 years. The validity of this assumption is
addressed in other papers in this volume.
The combination of relatively strong
productivity growth and rapidly diminishing
employment growth yields the real GDP val-
ues and growth rates seen in Table 1. Measured
in year 2000 dollars, real GDP rises from just
over $1 trillion in the year 2000 to slightly
over $2 trillion by 2030. In per capita terms
there is also a signiﬁcant increase, with a rise
of just over 60 percent over the 30-year span.
While not all of this extra output goes to con-
sumption, as the projection features strong
investment and net export growth, it is still
the foundation of a signiﬁcant increase in the
average standard of living.
Finally, note that the CPI inﬂation rate
stabilizes at just under 2 percent throughout
the 30-year horizon. We assume that the Bank
of Canada will maintain an inﬂation target of 2
percent, plus or minus 1 percent, for the next
three decades, and that prudent behaviour on
the part of the central bank will have the inﬂa-
tion rate fall slightly below the 2-percent tar-
get on average. With inﬂation thus stabilized, it
is not surprising that longer-term bond yields
are also very stable. Our projection for the 10-
year bond rate shows a real rate of 4.2 percent
— somewhat high by historical standards but
in line with strong productivity growth — and
therefore high returns on investment in Canada,
the United States and much of the world.
Tables 2 through 4 detail the major ﬁscal
indicators of the base case by level of govern-
ment, while Table 5 shows all governments
combined (and with major intergovernmental
transfers netted out). It should be noted at the
outset that all ﬁgures in these tables are calcu-
lated on a National Accounts basis, not the more
commonly reported Public Accounts basis. The
National Accounts measure is consistent with
the other components of National Accounts,
like GDP and its components, used throughout




Base Case: Federal Government Fiscal Indicators, 2000-2030 (National Accounts Basis)
Fiscal Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
In Billions $2000:
Revenues 194 199 214 234 252 273 295
Program Expenditures 131 156 176 200 223 247 272
of which: Transfers to Provinces 32 38 45 55 64 73 84
Interest on Debt  44 38 34 30 26 22 20
Balance 19 5 4 4 3 3 3
Debt 544 465 401 346 297 254 217
As a Percentage of GDP:
Revenues 18.4 16.2 15.2 14.8 14.5 14.3 14.2
Program Expenditures 12.4 12.7 12.5 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.1
of which: Transfers to Provinces 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.0
Interest on Debt  4.2 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0
Balance 1.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Debt 51.6 37.9 28.4 21.9 17.1 13.4 10.5
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formance of the federal government. (All ﬁg-
ures are in dollars with year 2000 purchasing
power — that is, inﬂation effects have been
removed.) As can be seen, in the year 2000 the
federal government ran a surplus of about
$19 billion — the difference between revenues
of $194 billion and program expenditures of
$131 billion — with an extra $44 billion for
interest payments on the national debt. These
revenues amounted to over 18 percent of
GDP, while federal debt, again on a National
Accounts basis, was just over 50 percent of
GDP. Our projection assumes that the feder-
al government will, on average, run surplus-
es, but not as large as those seen at the end of
the last decade. Interest on the debt declines
steadily as small amounts are paid off each
year, while interest rates remain stable. The
debt itself gradually declines as GDP grows
steadily; thus as a percentage of GDP it is
approximately 10 percent in 2030. After the
tax cuts recently put in place, and some fur-
ther cutting that we project for the second half
of the current decade, federal revenues are pro-
jected to fall from 18 percent of GDP in 2000
to something close to 14 percent by 2020 and
beyond. Program expenditures, however, will
actually rise slightly as a share of GDP com-
pared to the year 2000. The primary reason for
this, of course, is the declining level and share
of interest on the debt, which leaves room for
other expenditures even with ﬁxed or falling
revenues.
Table 3 shows ﬁscal indicators for
provincial and local governments. On a
National Accounts basis, the provinces and
territories also ran a surplus in the year 2000,
and we project smaller surpluses for most of
the years to come. Just as at the federal level,
revenues as a share of GDP are projected to
decline from 2000 levels during the ﬁrst half
of our projection, largely on the basis of tax
cuts already in place or being phased in by a
99
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TABLE 3
Base Case: Provincial, Territorial and Local Government Fiscal Indicators, 2000-2030
(National Accounts Basis)
Provincial/Territorial Governments
Fiscal Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
In Billions $2000:
Revenues 230 246 269 292 318 346 376
of which: Federal Transfers 32 38 45 55 64 73 84
Program Expenditures 190 215 242 280 299 329 362
of which: Transfers to Local Governments 32 36 40 45 50 56 63
Interest on Debt  29 26 22 19 16 14 12
Balance 11 5 4 4 4 3 3
As a Percentage of GDP:
Revenues 21.7 20.0 19.0 18.5 18.3 18.2 18.2
of which: Federal Transfers 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.0
Program Expenditures 18.0 17.5 17.1 17.7 17.2 17.3 17.5
of which: Transfers to Local Governments 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0
Interest on Debt  2.7 2.1 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6
Balance 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Local Governments
Revenues and Expenditures in billions $2000  79 90 101 113 125 138 151
Revenues and Expenditures as % of GDP 7.5 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3
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will be made in the second half of the current
decade. However, the reduction in revenues is
less pronounced for the provinces than for the
federal government. At the same time, increas-
es in expenditures are not as large for the
provinces as for the federal government, partly
because interest on the debt for the provinces
is lower to start with and declines at a slower
rate. However, it should be noted that part of
the increase in federal expenditures represents
increased transfers to the provinces as health-
care and education needs predominate in the
decades to come.
Local governments are assumed to run
balanced budgets, on average, and their revenues
and expenditures are therefore almost identical.
As can be seen, we project that the size of local
government as a share of GDP will remain
largely unchanged over the next three decades.
Finally, Table 4 shows the ﬁscal indicators
of the combined Canada and Quebec Pension
Plans. Included in the table is an estimate of the
cumulative balance or assets of the two plans.
The effects of the large increases in pension plan
contribution rates over the last several years can
be clearly seen in the projection of pension plan
revenues and in the large annual balances racked
up by the two plans in the middle years of the
three-decade span. From 2005 through 2020 the
annual balance of the plans exceeds 1 percent of
GDP, and the cumulative balances accumulate
rapidly — rising from 5.4 percent of GDP in
2000 to a maximum of around 18 percent by
about 2025. As the bulk of the baby boomers
retire after 2020, there is a pronounced growth
in expenditures relative to revenues, although our
projection shows the pension plans still running
a modest surplus in 2030.
Naturally, the projections for the pension
plan balances and cumulative assets are sensi-
tive to both the underlying economic growth
rate (which is the focus of this study) and the
payout rate. The latter will depend on the
extent of disability and non-retirement pay-
ments — partly a political decision — and on
the increase in the number of beneﬁt claims by
women, as this cohort, which showed an enor-
mous increase in labour force participation in
the 1960s and 1970s, reaches retirement age.
Each of these elements is difficult to estimate.
Assumptions and Judgements
Behind the Simulations
In order to run the alternative produc-
tivity growth simulations, we had to make a
number of major assumptions and judge-




Base Case: CPP/QPP Fiscal Indicators, 2000-2030 (National Accounts Basis)
Fiscal Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
In Billions $2000:
Revenues 30 43 52 61 69 76 81
Program Expenditures 26 30 35 43 52 64 75
Balance 4 13 17 18 17 12 6
Cumulative Balance (Assets) 57 104 169 238 300 342 353
As a Percentage of GDP:
Revenues 2.8 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9
Program Expenditures 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.6
Balance 0.4 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.3
Cumulative Balance (Assets) 5.4 8.5 11.9 15.1 17.2 18.0 17.0
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We assumed that the change in productivity
growth originated solely in a different rate of
total factor productivity (TFP) growth, not
from any contribution of capital. For the
moment we leave open the question of whether
there is a corresponding increase in the rest of
the world or whether the change is conﬁned
to Canada.
Components of aggregate demand. A differ-
ent productivity growth rate may or may not
change the underlying shares of aggregate
demand — and this, in turn, will have ﬁscal
implications, since some categories of ﬁnal
demand (e.g., consumption) have a greater tax
burden than others (e.g., investment or exports).
It is difficult to know if a society will translate
higher productivity growth into a larger share
of consumption or a larger share of investment
(“more jam today” or “more jam tomorrow”).
A higher productivity growth rate might
mean increased competitiveness and higher net
exports, but this depends on whether higher
productivity growth also occurs in the rest of
the world.
In light of these uncertainties it seemed
best to assume a neutral stance: in the simu-
lations, all shares of ﬁnal demand (except gov-
ernment spending) are increased or decreased
proportionately to the change in GDP result-
ing from higher or lower productivity growth.
Unemployment and labour force participa-
tion rates. As noted above, the base case has
the unemployment rate steady at just above
the full-employment rate. Higher or lower
productivity growth might conceivably
change the latter rate, but the evidence is not
compelling either way.
4 In terms of the
labour force, both the size of the population
and the labour force-participation rate could
conceivably change. A higher productivity
growth rate, for example, might serve to raise
immigration rates, but this is essentially a
policy decision. A higher productivity
growth rate, and the resultant higher real
wage (see below), might increase labour force
participation — but it might also decrease
it, as some of the higher real-wage returns are
taken in the form of leisure or early retire-
ment by households.
5 In the light of all these
possibilities, the simplest assumption is to
maintain the base-case unemployment and
labour force participation — and therefore
employment — rates under the alternative
productivity growth scenarios.
Prices and exchange rate. While higher
or lower productivity growth rates might
make the Bank of Canada’s job of achieving
its inﬂation targets somewhat easier (or hard-
er), we have little doubt that the net result
would be virtually no change in the average
inﬂation rate, since 2 percent is the Bank’s
inﬂation target no matter what the underly-
ing productivity growth rate might be. We
have therefore not allowed average prices to
change from the base case.
As for the exchange rate, changes in
Canada’s relative competitiveness would
depend, as noted above, on whether the pro-
ductivity growth rate change to be simulated
is also occurring in the rest of the world. They
would also depend on how Canadians choose to
adjust to their own changed productivity path
— for example, they might choose to increase
their purchases of imported goods, in which
case even a higher relative Canadian productiv-
ity growth rate would not translate into an
appreciation of the Canadian dollar. Once again,
the simplest assumption seems to be to keep
the exchange rate as it is in the base case.
Real wages. In the FOCUS model, changes
in labour productivity show up in changes in
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term simulation the lag becomes unimportant,
but we have kept the FOCUS principle that
real wages will reﬂect changes in labour-
productivity growth. In the alternative simu-
lations, therefore, the growth rate of real
private-sector wages is changed by the same
amount as the assumed change in labour-
productivity growth. The net result of this
assumption, and of the assumption of no
change in overall employment, means that
there is also very little change in the share of
wage and salary income in GDP, and in most
other income shares, under the alternative pro-
ductivity growth scenarios.
Nominal interest rates. Nominal interest
rates are, of course, simply the sum of real inter-
est rates plus expected future inﬂation. In the
alternative simulations, there is no change in
the underlying inﬂation rate that is anchored
by the Bank of Canada’s target inﬂation policy.
Whether there would be a change in real inter-
est rates is a more open question. If the pro-
ductivity growth is assumed to occur in Canada
only, it is unlikely that real interest rates would
change very much, since these are primarily
determined in world capital markets. However,
if the alternative productivity growth is assumed
to reﬂect a worldwide phenomenon, there might
indeed be a change in the real interest rate —
but by exactly how much remains unclear. Of
course, the issue of what happens to interest
rates is important for determining the ﬁscal
effects of alternative productivity growth rates.
Higher interest rates mean higher payouts of
interest on government debt too, which can
have important effects in long-term simula-
tions. At the same time, however, there could
be higher earnings by the public pension plans
on their accumulated assets.
Our initial assumption will be that
interest rates in Canada do not change —
which would reﬂect either the fact that the
alternative productivity growth rate is conﬁned
to Canada or the fact that world real rates are
insensitive to the relatively small changes in
productivity growth rates that we will be
examining. We will, however, develop an
alternative scenario in which the real interest
rate and the nominal interest rate are changed
by some relatively arbitrary amount in response
to a change in the productivity growth rate.
Government-sector wages. It is generally rec-




Base Case: Combined Government
1 Fiscal Indicators, 2000-2030
(National Accounts Basis)
Fiscal Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
In Billions $2000:
Revenues 469 504 551 600 650 703 757
Program Expenditures 362 418 470 536 585 648 714
Interest on Debt (Fed+Prov) 73 64 56 49 42 36 31
Balance 34 22 26 26 24 18 12
As a Percentage of GDP:
Revenues 44.4 41.0 39.0 37.9 37.4 37.0 36.5
Program Expenditures 34.3 34.0 33.3 33.9 33.6 34.1 34.5
Interest on Debt (Fed+Prov) 6.9 5.2 4.0 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.5
Balance 3.2 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.0 0.6
1 Net of intergovernmental transfers.
Peter Dungan text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 102difficult to measure in the public sector and
other non-commercial sectors. When goods
and services are sold through the market,
there is an observable difference between the
price at which they are sold and the cost of
producing them. National income account-
ants therefore have at least some chance of
determining whether there has been a change
in productivity. Government outputs, how-
ever, are not sold, and therefore national
accounts have no way of determining their
market value. According to national account-
ing conventions, therefore, the value of gov-
ernment output is equal to the value of the
inputs — largely labour and government cap-
ital stock. Thus productivity growth is unlike-
ly to show up in the public sector under
standard national income accounting. If infor-
mation technology, for example, permits 10
workers in a government office to perform the
same functions that previously were per-
formed by a hundred workers, the govern-
ment output is deemed to have fallen, since
the inputs have fallen.
What this all means is that the market
competition mechanism that normally passes
productivity improvements through to real
wages in the private sector is not automatical-
ly at work in the public sector. Nonetheless,
government still competes for workers with
the private sector and, it might be argued, an
increase in general labour productivity in the
economy will still show up as higher wages in
the government sector. On the other side, it
might be argued that the greater security of
government jobs, and the continual pressure
on governments to provide more services and
cut taxes, might cause government-sector
wages to be much less sensitive than private-
sector wages to changes in productivity growth
— as has been the case in recent decades.
Our initial assumption in the simula-
tions below is that government wages do
indeed change to the same extent as private-sec-
tor wages. That is, if we assume a higher pro-
ductivity growth rate we must also assume a
higher rate of wage growth in the public sec-
tor — which can add signiﬁcantly to govern-
ment-sector costs and blunt the ﬁscal impact
of stronger productivity. (Note that current-
ly approximately 75 percent of government
spending on goods and services is wage-based,
and this type of spending is just under half of
all government spending, which also includes
transfers and interest on the public debt.) We
will also conduct an alternative simulation in
which the pass-through of changes in pro-
ductivity to government wages does not
occur, but this is an extreme alternative. If
government wages do not follow the private
sector fully, then most likely they will follow
it at least partially — but we have no way of
knowing by how much. We therefore present
a polar case with the caution that government
wages are unlikely to be completely unaffect-
ed by productivity-based changes in private-
sector real wages.
Government spending and taxation. One of
the last speciﬁcations for the simulations to be
conducted is perhaps the most important: what
will be the spending or taxation reaction of the
government sector? Borrowing on the experi-
ence gained during the “ﬁscal dividend” exer-
cises for the ﬁnance department, we make three
assumptions. First, government real spending
on goods and services is set the same as in the
base case. It is true that a scenario of higher or
lower productivity growth may very well cause
a change in the growth path of government
spending, but there are no agreed-upon rules
by which this change might occur. We intend
to measure the growth or decline in ﬁscal “room
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might yield, instead of prejudging how that
room to manoeuvre will be used up. Second, we
similarly assume that tax rates are unchanged
from the base case. Once again, to do otherwise
would be to prejudge what governments will
do as the room to manoeuvre on the ﬁscal side
becomes smaller or larger. Third, and this
might seem unusual, we assume also that gov-
ernments will pursue the same ﬁscal balances
as they do in the base case. In other words, sur-
pluses or deﬁcits are assumed to be unchanged
from the base case. Behind this last assumption
is the notion that, in the longer term, govern-
ments will avoid deﬁcits, but also that they will
see little political gain in running anything
above modest surpluses. Should spending needs
or taxation change, rather than balances adjust-
ing, corresponding adjustments will be made
in other categories of spending or taxation.
Nonetheless, under alternative produc-
tivity growth rates, there will clearly be
changes in tax revenues, transfer payments and
endogenous spending components. Where,
then, do these go? Again using the experience
of the “ﬁscal dividend” exercise, it is assumed
that they go into non-taxable transfers to per-
sons — or, equivalently, a lump-sum change
in personal income taxes.
This assumption turns out to be the
most neutral in terms of effects on the rest of
the economy. To assume that the endogenous
responses in taxation, transfers and spending
would show up in changes in current spending
on goods and services distorts the shares of
GDP. Worse still, to assume that they would
show up in the ﬁscal balance is in fact not neu-
tral, because a change in the ﬁscal balance caus-
es a change in government debt and therefore
interest payments on the debt. Because this
effect can accumulate rapidly over a long-term
simulation, it gives a false picture of the change
in the ﬁscal room to manoeuvre available to
governments. In a high-productivity scenario,
for example, government revenues would
increase. If these were devoted to debt pay-
down, interest on the debt would be lower in
future years and the ﬁscal room to manoeuvre
would be larger still. However, part of this
increase in ﬁscal room to manoeuvre would
simply be the result of the decision to use the
initial productivity increase and its effect on
revenues to pay down the debt, instead of mak-
ing some other change in policy. In a scenario
of lower productivity growth, it might be
expected that ﬁscal balances would be smaller
and debt higher, and therefore that interest
payments on the debt would be higher. But
again, if governments responded by raising
taxes or reducing spending elsewhere, and leav-
ing the ﬁscal balance unchanged, there would
be no change in debt or in interest payments
on the debt, and the ﬁscal room to manoeuvre,
while still negative, would be lower than in a
case of reduced surpluses and increased debt.
6
In sum, therefore, the lesson of the ﬁscal-
dividend exercise is that it is better to put incip-
ient changes in ﬁscal balances into non-taxable
transfers to persons rather than into debt pay-
down or changes in tax rates or government
spending — and that is the practice followed
here. When the tables for the various simula-
tions report on the ﬁscal impact by level of gov-
ernment, what they are reporting is this
calculation of what would need to be changed
in transfers to persons in order to keep the ﬁscal
balance from deviating from the base case.
There is one exception to this rule. For
the public pension plans, a change in the pro-
ductivity growth rate is permitted to change
the ﬁscal balance — and it likely will, since
contributions are based on wages that will
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based on inﬂation, which we assume will not
change. Over the next 30 years, higher or
lower collections or earnings by the pension
plans likely will not signiﬁcantly alter the
currently legislated contribution or payout
rates (unless disaster appears imminent).
However, the accumulated surplus of the
plans likely will vary, and this does, of
course, have implications for earnings and
balances later in the simulation period.
Intergovernmental transfers. In the wild
and wonderful Canadian federal system, large
sums of money ﬂow between levels of govern-
ment. As can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, the fed-
eral government transferred about $32 billion
to the provinces in 2000, and the provinces
transferred almost an equal amount to local
governments. While the treatment of inter-
governmental transfers does not affect the cal-
culation of the ﬁscal impact of alternative
productivity growth rates for the combined
government sector, clearly it does affect the
measure of ﬁscal impacts by different levels of
government.
Most of the simulations assume that fed-
eral transfers to the provinces will change in
proportion to any change in the productivity
growth rate — that is, if the economy improves
and the federal government collects higher
taxes, political pressures will push it in the
direction of increasing transfers to the provinces
by a proportional amount. However, other out-
comes are possible, and one simulation that
assumes no change in federal transfers will be
presented to gauge the sensitivity of this issue.
Local governments are assumed to bal-
ance their budgets on average, with the bal-
ancing factor being transfers from the
provinces. A change from the base case that
tends to increase local spending will therefore
cause increased transfers from the provinces to
the municipalities, while a rise in local tax col-
lections, all else being equal, will tend to
reduce provincial transfers. In this way, the ﬁs-
cal impact on local governments of alternative
productivity growth rates generally ends up as
a ﬁscal impact on the provinces.
RESULTS: FISCAL IMPACTS UNDER
HIGH AND LOW PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH RATES
A total of ﬁve simulations are presented
in this section. The ﬁrst, and principal, simula-
tion shows the impact of assuming a relatively
modest addition of 0.3 percent to the annual
productivity growth rate from 2004 through
2030. For this simulation it is assumed: ﬁrst,
that public-sector real wages follow productiv-
ity-based increases in real wages in the private
sector; second, that federal transfers to the
provinces are increased at the same rate as pro-
ductivity growth; and third, that the interest
rates of the base case do not change under the
higher assumed productivity growth.
The second simulation follows the ﬁrst
but simply reverses the assumed productivi-
ty change to a reduction of 0.3 percent per
year (or to a level of roughly 1.5 percent per
year through the simulation period). All
other assumptions follow Simulation 1.
Simulation 3 assumes an increase in
productivity identical to Simulation 1 but
assumes no response in public-sector real
wages. Simulation 4 again follows Simulation
1, but assumes no response of federal trans-
fers to the provinces. Finally, Simulation 5
also follows Simulation 1 but assumes that
interest rates rise an (arbitrary) 0.3 percent
in line with higher productivity.
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Increase in Productivity Growth
Results for Simulation 1 are displayed
in Table 6. The results are depicted in several
forms: some — for example, the Productivity
Growth Rate or Federal Government Revenues
— are the solution levels for this simulation.
Note again that all dollar values are expressed
in terms of year 2000 dollars, to remove inﬂa-
tion distortion. Other results show the change
from the base-case projection described in the
second section of the paper. For example, line
2 of the table reminds us that in this simula-
tion the productivity growth rate is 0.3 per-
centage points above that in the base
projection. These changes are sometimes
shown in levels (as for the productivity growth
rate) and sometimes as a percentage of the
base-case projection. Finally, the ﬁscal impact
of the change in productivity growth is shown
not only in levels form (in $2000) but also as
a percentage of the relevant government
expenditures in the base case. The table offers
snapshots of the results at ﬁve-year intervals
from 2005 through 2030, but most of the dis-
cussion will focus on results for the last year
shown.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 6 shows the
impact of an assumed 0.3-percentage-point
higher productivity growth on real GDP and
GDP per capita. As can be seen, a relatively
small change in productivity growth, if sus-
tained for a long interval, can have large
cumulative effects in terms of outcomes.
With productivity growth increasing by
0.3 percent between 2004 and 2030, by the
year 2030 real GDP would be higher by $171
billion, or a little over 8 percent higher than
in the base case, while real GDP per capita
would be just over $60,000, and $4,600
above the base-case projection.
For the federal government, the high-
er productivity growth rate increases rev-
enues by $28 billion by 2030. This is an
increase of approximately 9.5 percent above
the base case, which is slightly above the 8.3-
percent increase in GDP in the simulation.
Not surprisingly, the revenue elasticity of the
federal government in the model is some-
what greater than one.
Since the federal balance is assumed not
to change from base in the simulation, the
increase in revenue must be exactly matched
by changes in expenditure. Two increases
occur automatically, given the assumptions
behind this particular simulation: “Other
Induced Changes in Expenditures” amount to
$6 billion in 2030 and are largely the result
of increased payments to federal employees as
the federal government must match the real-
wage increases gained by private-sector work-
ers under the higher productivity gains. A
further $7 billion goes in increased transfers
to the provinces, under the assumption that
these will move in proportion to higher pro-
ductivity growth and increased GDP.
What remains, about $15 billion in
2030, is the true ﬁscal impact of the higher
productivity growth — an amount equalling
about 5.5 percent of total federal expendi-
tures in the base case. This is the amount
that could be used for further tax cuts, new
or expanded expenditure programs, or more
aggressive debt reduction. (If debt reduction
were to be selected, there would, of course,
be a compound effect on the ﬁscal impact, as
interest payments on the debt would also be
reduced over time — as discussed in the sec-
ond section.) Note that, because some of the
increased federal revenue from higher pro-
ductivity growth is diverted to higher real
wages and higher transfers to the provinces,
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base expenditures, rises less than in propor-
tion to the increase in GDP.
For the provincial governments, the
increase in revenues by 2030 is about $39 bil-
lion — or slightly more than 10 percent above
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TABLE 6
Simulation 1: Productivity Growth 0.3-Percent Increase Per Year — Public-Sector Real
Wages Respond (Federal Transfers Respond; Base Interest Rates)
Economic and Fiscal Indicators 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Change from Base 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Real GDP (billions $2000)                  1235 1443 1637 1830 2030 2242
Change from Base 7 29 57 89 127 171
% Change from Base 0.6 2.1 3.6 5.1 6.7 8.3
Real GDP Per Capita (thousands $2000) 38.5 43.3 47.5 51.5 55.7 60.3
Change from Base 0.2 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.5 4.6
Federal Government
Revenues (billions $2000)  200 219 244 267 294 323
Change from Base 1 5 10 15 21 28
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 
(after change in transfers to provinces) 1 3 6 9 12 15
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.6 1.9 3.0 3.9 4.8 5.5
Change in Transfers to Provinces (billions $2000) 0 1 2 3 5 7
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000)  0 1 2 3 5 6
Provincial/Territorial Governments
Revenues (billions $2000)  248 276 306 339 375 415
Change from Base 2 7 13 21 29 39
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 
(after changes in federal and local transfers) 1 4 7 10 14 18
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.4 1.4 2.3 3.2 4.0 4.7
Change in Transfers to Local Gov't (billions $2000)  0 1 2 3 4 6
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000)  1 2 5 7 11 15
Local Governments
Revenues (billions $2000)  90 103 116 129 144 159
Change from Base 0 1 3 4 6 8
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(excluding change in provincial transfers) 0 0 1 1 1 2
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) 0 1 3 4 6 8
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
Revenues (billions $2000)  44 53 63 73 82 90
Change from Base 0 1 2 4 6 9
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 0 1 2 4 6 9
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.5 2.6 4.9 7.2 9.6 12.3
Combined Government 
(Net of Intergovernmental Transfers)
Revenues (billions $2000)  508 566 628 694 765 840
Change from Base 3 13 24 37 53 71
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 2 8 15 23 32 42
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0 2 3 4 5 6
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000)  1 5 9 15 21 29
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percent increase in GDP. Of course, these rev-
enue increases include the $7 billion in transfers
from the federal government that rose fully
with the productivity increase. Again, since
provincial balances are assumed not to change,
the revenue increase is fully matched by
increases in expenditures. First, induced
expenditures resulting from higher real wages
rise by $15 billion — signiﬁcantly more than
for the federal government, as at the provin-
cial level a larger share of expenditure is allocat-
ed to wages. A further $6 billion is transferred
to local governments to keep their balances
from moving into deﬁcit — on which more
immediately below. This leaves $18 billion
as the ﬁnal ﬁscal impact of the productivity
increase, which, at about 4.7 percent of base
expenditures, represents a slightly smaller
proportional impact than that for the federal
government. Again, these funds could be used
to cut taxes further, to increase real expendi-
tures or to reduce public debt (with the last
having a further compounding effect through
reduced interest charges).
Local governments, with a relatively
inelastic tax base, show a much smaller propor-
tional revenue increase than the federal or
provincial governments. Of the $8 billion in
extra revenue in 2030, fully $6 billion results
from increased transfers from the provinces and
only $2 billion from higher productivity
growth. This is the ﬁscal impact at the local
level, and it amounts to only a little over 1 per-
cent of base local expenditures by 2030.
However, local governments are also major
employers, and we have assumed that public-
sector wages will increase in line with produc-
tivity improvements in the private sector. Local
governments therefore need to pay out an addi-
tional $8 billion by 2030 in induced wage
expenditures. To do this, they must, in effect,
use up their own $2 billion of ﬁscal impact and
obtain an additional $6 billion in transfers from
the provincial governments.
For the Canada and Quebec Pension
Plans, the dynamics and results differ some-
what from those of the three levels of govern-
ment. First, the pension plans have no change
in induced expenditures to speak of, since they
employ few workers of their own and since
pension payouts are calibrated on inﬂation
(which has not changed), not on current real
wages — although this situation could change
with signiﬁcant real-wage variation in the
economy. Second, the balance of the pension
plans is not assumed to be ﬁxed, as it is for the
three levels of government. Higher produc-
tivity growth serves to increase revenues much
more than expenditures and leads to larger
surpluses and more asset accumulation — and
these extra assets themselves also contribute to
earnings. By 2030, revenues are above base by
$9 billion, or over 12 percent of base expen-
ditures of the pension plans. The percentage
increase in revenues is greater than that in
GDP, because the higher contributions from
wages earlier in the simulation increase the
assets of the pension plans and so compound
into higher earnings on assets. As can be seen in
Table 6, the percentage improvement in ﬁscal
impact steadily widens relative to the percent-
age change in GDP, reﬂecting compounding
through investment earnings of the pension
plans.
Finally, the last panel in Table 6 aggre-
gates the levels of government and nets out
intergovernmental transfers. It is estimated
that by 2030 aggregate government revenues
will have increased by $71 billion, of which
$29 billion goes to induced wage expendi-
tures in the public sector and $42 billion, or
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tures in the base case, are available for tax
cuts, expenditure enhancement or debt
reduction.
Simulation 2: 0.3-Percent
Decrease in Productivity Growth
Simulation 2 is simply Simulation 1 in
reverse — productivity growth is assumed to
be 0.3 percent lower than in the base case,
which is about the average attained by the
Canadian economy in the 1990s. The most
important thing to note about the simulation
is that the results are not simply those of
Simulation 1 with changed signs (see Table 7).
Compounding matters: 0.3 percent less growth
per year does not reduce GDP over 30 years as
much as 0.3 percent more growth enhances it.
After 30 years, GDP is 7.6 percent below base,
while in Simulation 1, with 0.3 percent extra
growth, GDP is 8.3 percent above base. There
are corresponding proportional effects through
the remainder of the results.
While we need not go through the
results in detail, one item to note is that the
factor of “induced expenditures” works to
mitigate the negative impacts of lower pro-
ductivity growth. For the combined gov-
ernment sector, a 0.3-percent reduction in
the productivity growth rate means $66 bil-
lion less revenue by 2030, but of this
amount $27 billion is “saved” in the form
of lower wage expenditures. Nonetheless,
there is still a ﬁscal-impact shortfall of
$39 billion, which will have to made up in
the form of higher taxes, lower expenditures
or less debt paydown. And, as noted in
Simulation 1, there is no “induced” effect
on the public pension side. Table 7 shows
that pension plan revenue would be reduced
by $9 billion in 2030 under the assumed
lower productivity growth rate. In the base
case (see Table 4), the pension plan surplus
is only $6 billion in 2030. This would
translate into a deﬁcit of $3 billion under
the assumed lower productivity growth rate.
While this picture does not indicate insol-
vency — since the pension plans still have
large accumulated assets at this point — it
does indicate the relative sensitivity of the
pension plan system to the underlying pro-
ductivity growth rate.
Simulation 3: 0.3-Percent
Increase in Productivity Growth
— No Response of Public-Sector
Wages
Simulation 3 assumes the same increase
in productivity growth as Simulation 1, but
with no response of public-sector wages. As
can be seen in Table 8, induced expenditures,
aside from the wage response, are very small;
therefore, in this simulation virtually all of
the increased revenue from higher produc-
tivity growth translates into ﬁscal impact at
the combined government level.
Of the government levels, the chief
beneﬁciary of assuming a low wage response
is the provincial level. Under the assump-
tions for this simulation, the federal govern-
ment is still obliged to increase transfers to
the provinces when productivity growth
improves, and the federal government — due
to transfers and interest payments on the
debt — has a smaller share of wage expendi-
ture. Thus, the federal ﬁscal impact in this
simulation increases from $15 to $20 billion
— a substantial improvement but much
smaller than that at the provincial level,
where the impact increases from $18 to
$41 billion. Not only do the provinces “save”
the expenditure they would have had to make
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ernments do not have to increase their wage
payments (relative to Simulation 1), the
provinces need not increase their transfers to
the local level. In fact, because the local gov-




Simulation 2:  Productivity Growth 0.3-Percent Decrease Per Year —  Public-Sector Real
Wages Respond (Federal Transfers Respond; Base Interest Rates)
Economic and Fiscal Indicators 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
Change from Base -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Real GDP (billions $2000) 1220 1384 1525 1655 1784 1912
Change from Base -7 -29 -55 -85 -119 -158
% Change from Base -0.6 -2.0 -3.5 -4.9 -6.3 -7.6
Real GDP Per Capita (thousands $2000) 38.0 41.6 44.3 46.6 48.9 51.4
Change from Base -0.2 -0.9 -1.6 -2.4 -3.3 -4.3
Federal Government
Revenues (billions $2000) 198 209 224 238 253 269
Change from Base -1 -5 -10 -14 -20 -26
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(after change in transfers to provinces) -1 -3 -6 -8 -11 -14
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures -0.6 -1.9 -2.9 -3.7 -4.5 -5.1
Change in Transfers to Provinces (billions $2000) 0 -1 -2 -3 -5 -6
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000) 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -6
Provincial/Territorial Governments
Revenues (billions $2000) 244 262 279 299 319 340
Change from Base -2 -7 -13 -20 -27 -36
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(after changes in federal and local transfers) -1 -4 -7 -10 -13 -16
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures -0.4 -1.4 -2.2 -3.0 -3.7 -4.4
Change in Transfers to Local Gov't (billions $2000) 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -6
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000) -1 -2 -5 -7 -10 -14
Local Governments
Revenues (billions $2000) 89 100 111 121 132 144
Change from Base 0 -1 -2 -4 -6 -7
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(excluding change in provincial transfers) 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -2
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) 0 -1 -2 -4 -6 -7
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
Revenues (billions $2000) 43 51 59 65 70 72
Change from Base 0 -1 -2 -4 -6 -9
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 0 -1 -2 -4 -6 -9
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures -0.5 -2.6 -4.8 -7.0 -9.1 -11.6
Combined Government 
(Net of Intergovernmental Transfers)
Revenues (billions $2000) 500 537 573 609 645 679
Change from Base -3 -13 -23 -36 -50 -66
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) -2 -8 -14 -22 -30 -39
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0 -2 -3 -4 -5 -5
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) -1 -5 -9 -14 -20 -27
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local governments in balance, the provinces
are actually able to slightly reduce their
transfers to the local level. Of course, the
huge ﬁscal impact for the provinces could
well end up in increased transfers to local
governments, which might be used to
increase expenditures (or lower taxes) at the
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TABLE 8
Simulation 3: Productivity Growth 0.3-Percent Increase Per Year — No Response of Public-
Sector Wages (Federal Transfers Respond; Base Interest Rates)
Economic and Fiscal Indicators 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Change from Base 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Real GDP (billions $2000) 1235 1443 1637 1830 2030 2242
Change from Base 7 29 57 89 127 171
% Change from Base 0.6 2.1 3.6 5.1 6.7 8.3
Federal Government
Revenues (billions $2000) 201 219 244 268 294 323
Change from Base 1 5 10 15 21 28
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(after changes in federal and local transfers) 1 4 8 12 16 20
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.7 2.4 3.9 5.2 6.4 7.4
Change in Transfers to Provinces (billions $2000) 0 1 2 3 5 7
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000) 0 0 0 1 1 1
Provincial/Territorial Governments
Revenues (billions $2000) 248 276 306 339 376 415
Change from Base 2 7 14 21 30 39
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(excluding change in federal transfers) 2 8 14 22 31 41
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.8 2.8 4.9 6.9 8.9 11.0
Change in Transfers to Local Gov't (billions $2000) 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -2
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Local Governments
Revenues (billions $2000) 90 101 113 125 138 151
Change from Base 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(excluding change in provincial transfers) 0 0 1 1 1 2
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
Revenues (billions $2000) 44 53 63 73 82 90
Change from Base 0 1 2 4 6 9
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 0 1 2 4 6 9
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.5 2.6 4.8 7.1 9.4 12.0
Combined Government 
(Net of Intergovernmental Transfers)
Revenues (billions $2000) 507 565 625 690 760 833
Change from Base 3 13 24 38 54 72
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 3 13 24 37 53 70
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 1 3 4 6 8 10
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) 0 0 0 1 1
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change.
Finally, note that for the public pen-
sion plans the results of this simulation are
almost identical to those of Simulation 1.
The smaller wage payouts at the government
level lead to somewhat reduced pension-plan
contributions, but the difference in the ﬁscal
dividend as a percentage of expenditures in
2030 is only 0.3 percent.
Simulation 4: 0.3-Percent
Increase in Productivity Growth
— No Change in Federal
Transfers
Simulation 4 is identical to Simulation 1
except that federal transfers to the provinces are
not increased in proportion to the assumed high-
er growth rate. The net result is a change only in
the outcomes for the federal government and the
provinces (see Table 9). The results for the com-
bined government, local governments and pen-
sion plans are the same as in Simulation 1.
In Simulation 1, the ﬁscal impacts for
the federal and provincial governments are
very close as a percentage of base-case expen-
ditures (5.5 percent for the federal government
vs. 4.7 for the provinces). In Simulation 4 the
balance changes dramatically in favour of the
federal government. With no change in trans-
fers to the provinces, the extra 0.3-percent
productivity growth results in a ﬁscal impact
equal to 8 percent of base expenditures in
2030, versus an impact of only 2.9 percent at
the provincial level.
Simulation 5: 0.3-Percent
Increase in Productivity Growth
— Interest Rates +0.3 Percent
The ﬁnal simulation assumes that high-
er productivity growth is a worldwide phe-
nomenon that increases real interest rates. An
arbitrary 0.3-percent increase has been chosen.
There is no change in the impact on GDP,
compared to Simulation 1, but the results (see
Table 10) show a varied impact by level of
government.
Since it holds the largest debt at the
starting point, the federal government is the
most negatively affected. The larger inter-
est payments resulting from the higher
interest rates serve to increase induced
expenditures and make the ﬁscal impact of
the higher productivity growth path slight-
ly negative in 2005. However, as time pass-
es, the higher cumulative output caused by
higher productivity growth generates more
and more additional revenue, while the
effect of higher interest rates on debt pay-
ments actually decreases (since debt is grad-
ually reduced in the base case). By 2030 the
ﬁscal impact on the federal government is 5
percent of base expenditures, instead of the
5.5 percent when interest rates did not
change. The primary impact of higher inter-
est rates, therefore, is “up front” and fades
over time.
The provinces also have public debt
charges that are increased by higher interest
rates, but, compared to the federal govern-
ment, these are smaller in proportion to
revenues and expenditures. The fiscal
impact of higher productivity growth is
reduced from 0.4 to 0.2 percent of base
expenditures in 2005, and thereafter fades
further. By 2030 the assumed higher inter-
est rates have reduced the ﬁscal impact as a
share of base expenditures from 4.7 to 4.6
percent.
As the local governments have little
debt, higher rates make almost no difference
to their ﬁscal proﬁle. To the extent there is
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earnings rise slightly.
Finally, the public pension plans
gain from higher real rates as their accu-
mulated surpluses earn higher returns. By
2030, the fiscal impact of higher produc-
tivity with higher interest rates is 12 per-
cent of base expenditures, as opposed to
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TABLE 9
Simulation 4: Productivity Growth 0.3-Percent Increase Per Year  — No Change in Federal
Transfers (Public-Sector Real Wages Respond; Base Interest Rates)
Economic and Fiscal Indicators 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Change from Base 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Real GDP (billions $2000)                  1235 1443 1637 1830 2030 2242
Change from Base 7 29 57 89 127 171
% Change from Base 0.6 2.1 3.6 5.1 6.7 8.3
Federal Government
Revenues (billions $2000)  200 219 244 267 294 323
Change from Base 1 5 10 15 21 28
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 
(after changes in federal and local transfers) 1 4 8 12 17 22
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.7 2.4 3.9 5.4 6.7 8.0
Change in Transfers to Provinces (billions $2000)  0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000)  0 1 2 3 5 6
Provincial/Territorial Governments
Revenues (billions $2000)  248 276 306 339 375 415
Change from Base 2 7 13 21 29 39
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 
(excluding change in federal transfers) 1 3 5 7 9 11
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.3 1.0 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.9
Change in Transfers to Local Gov't (billions $2000)  0 1 2 3 4 6
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000)  1 3 7 11 16 21
Local Governments
Revenues (billions $2000)  90 103 116 129 144 159
Change from Base 0 1 3 4 6 8
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 
(excluding change in provincial transfers) 0 0 1 1 1 2
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000)  0 1 3 4 6 8
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
Revenues (billions $2000)  44 53 63 73 82 90
Change from Base 0 1 2 4 6 9
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)  0 1 2 4 6 9
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.5 2.6 4.9 7.2 9.6 12.3
Combined Government 
(Net of Intergovernmental Transfers)
Revenues (billions $2000)  508 566 628 694 765 840
Change from Base 3 14 26 41 58 78
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)  2 8 15 23 32 42
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0 2 3 4 5 6
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000)  1 6 11 18 26 36
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change. In 2030 also, the positive impact
on the pension plans is actually slightly
greater than the negative impact of higher
interest charges at the federal and provin-
cial levels, and the combined government





Simulation 5: Productivity Growth 0.3-Percent Increase Per Year — Interest Rates 0.3-
Percent Increase (Public-Sector Real Wages Respond; Federal Transfers Respond)
Economic and Fiscal Indicators 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Change from Base 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Real GDP (billions $2000) 1235 1443 1637 1830 2030 2242
Change from Base 7 29 57 89 127 171
% Change from Base 0.6 2.1 3.6 5.1 6.7 8.3
Federal Government
Revenues (billions $2000) 201 220 244 267 294 322
Change from Base 2 6 10 15 21 27
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(after changes in federal and local transfers) 0 2 5 7 10 13
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures -0.3 1.1 2.3 3.3 4.2 5.0
Change in Transfers to Provinces (billions $2000) 0 1 2 3 5 7
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000) 2 3 4 5 6 7
Provincial/Territorial Governments
Revenues (billions $2000) 248 276 306 339 375 415
Change from Base 3 8 14 21 29 39
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(excluding change in federal transfers) 0 3 6 10 13 17
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.2 1.2 2.1 3.0 3.8 4.6
Change in Transfers to Local Gov't (billions $2000) 0 1 2 3 4 6
Other Induced Changes in Expenditures 
(billions $2000) 2 4 6 8 11 15
Local Governments
Revenues ($2000 Bill) 90 103 116 129 144 159
Change from Base 0 1 3 4 6 8
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000)
(excluding change in provincial transfers) 0 0 1 1 1 2
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) 0 1 3 4 6 8
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
Revenues (billions $2000) 44 54 64 74 84 93
Change from Base 0 1 3 5 8 12
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 0 1 3 5 8 12
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0.7 3.6 6.6 9.6 12.5 15.7
Combined Government 
(Net of Intergovernmental Transfers)
Revenues (billions $2000) 509 567 629 696 767 843
Change from Base 5 14 26 39 55 73
Fiscal Impact of Prod'ty Change (billions $2000) 0 7 14 22 32 43
Fiscal Impact as % of Base Expenditures 0 1 3 4 5 6
Induced Changes in Expenditures (billions $2000) 5 8 12 17 23 30
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AND WORK TO BE DONE
The simulations described above indi-
cate that even relatively small changes in pro-
ductivity growth rates can cumulate over
several decades into large changes in GDP
and living standards, and can signiﬁcantly
alter the ﬁscal room to manoeuvre of the fed-
eral and provincial governments and the pub-
lic pension plans. This is true whether we are
contemplating higher productivity growth
rates or lower ones.
Of the sensitivities tested, the most
important one turned out to be the response
of government-sector wages to changes in pri-
vate-sector real wages that would likely occur
under alternative productivity growth rates. If
higher productivity growth passes through to
higher public-sector wages (as would seem
likely), then the ﬁscal impact of higher pro-
ductivity growth is muted. Under higher pro-
ductivity growth, some of the increased
government revenues simply go to pay higher
public-sector wages. If, on the other hand,
productivity growth is lower than thought,
then the negative impact on government is
partly offset by a reduction in government-
wage rates. This effect is important for the
provincial level of government, somewhat less
so for the federal level and barely discernable
for the public pension plans.
If real interest rates move with higher
or lower productivity growth rates, the ﬁscal
impact is on average very small. An interest-
rate response mutes the impact of changes in
productivity growth for the federal and
provincial governments, primarily in the near
term. On the other hand, the ﬁscal impact on
the public pension plans is ampliﬁed by an
interest-rate response.
This study is only the beginning of an
inquiry into the interconnections between
productivity and ﬁscal policy. At least two
groups of issues remain to be addressed.
7
First, we have discussed only how pro-
ductivity growth affects the ﬁscal room to
manoeuvre. Undoubtedly ﬁscal policy also
has important feedbacks for productivity
growth. How the ﬁscal room to manoeuvre
is used can make a signiﬁcant difference:
some tax cuts or expenditure increases could
raise productivity growth, through either
improved technology or capital accumula-
tion, while some badly designed new social
programs could serve to reduce incentives
and productivity growth. Also, feedback
from ﬁscal policy to productivity becomes
more important the further out the projec-
tions go. The possibilities are too numerous,
and the connections to productivity too
imprecise, to be included in a macroecono-
metric model, but the problem is an impor-
tant one. The question also arises: What is
the best use of ﬁscal room in order to fur-
ther raise productivity growth? Clearly,
though, this represents a large and separate
research agenda.
Second, the issue of whether a produc-
tivity change is conﬁned to Canada or is uni-
versal also has implications that cannot be
modelled. In particular, a general increase in
productivity could lead to extended ﬁscal
room to manoeuvre in many countries, some
of which would likely be used — especially
in the United States — to lower tax rates.
Canada might well be obliged to devote
some of its ﬁscal room to manoeuvre to
matching such tax cuts, thereby reducing the
amount of the extra room to manoeuvre that
is truly discretionary and that could be
devoted to social programs.
8
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I would like to thank Andrew Sharpe and an
anonymous referee for extremely useful comments on
an earlier draft. Any remaining errors are my own.
1 For a discussion of some of these issues about future
alternative productivity growth paths, see Dungan
and Wilson (2002) and other papers in the same
volume.
2 The projection was prepared before the release of
census 2001 data; while the population ﬁgures may
seem high compared to the census ﬁgures released in
early 2002, it must be kept in mind that the latter
will eventually be inﬂated by an under-reporting
factor by Statistics Canada before they become the
official population ﬁgures.
3 Output per hour is a superior productivity measure
when available, but reliable and consistent long-term
time series data have been difficult to obtain for the
model.
4 The argument is sometimes made that higher
productivity growth pushed down the full-
employment unemployment rate in the second half
of the 1990s, especially in the United States.
However, it could be that we simply did not know
what the rate was before then, after the early 1990s
recession and recovery, and that it had been lower
than we thought all along. This is certainly the
author’s opinion about the Canadian full-
employment rate, which, to the extent that it did
decline, did so for reasons of an aging work force and
a stiffening of Employment Insurance qualiﬁcations
and reduced payout rates.
5 Theoretical macroeconomics makes labour supply a
function of the real wage, but the empirical evidence
is slim. In the FOCUS macroeconometric model,
labour force participation is a function of
employment availability, and, for some age/sex
groups, leniency of EI regulations and relative cohort
size, but it is not a function of the real wage.
6 The discussion here is the proper measure of the
ﬁscal room to manoeuvre, not how to make use of it.
The compounding effect of early debt paydown is a
strong argument in favour of using some ﬁscal room
to manoeuvre for this purpose. There is, however, a
re-entry problem to be kept in mind: the more
rapidly one approaches an “optimal” debt/GDP level
(whatever it might be), the more rapidly ﬁscal policy
must be switched to tax cuts or expenditure
increases, with potentially wrenching effects on the
industrial make-up and skills set of the economy.
7 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for much of
what follows.
8 The dilemma, of course, is greater still if the
productivity increase occurs in other countries and
not in Canada, leading to pressures to cut taxes with
no compensating additional ﬁscal room.
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